Banking instability and regulation in the U.S. free banking era by Arthur J. Rolnick & Warren E. Weber
Banking Instability and Regulation 
in the U.S. Free Banking Era (p. 2) 
Arthur J. Rolnick 
Warren E. Weber 
Adjustable Rate Mortgages: 
Increasing Efficiency 
More Than Housing Activity (p. 1 0> 
Michael J. Stutzer 
William Roberds Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review 
Vol. 9, NO. 3 ISSN 0271-5287 
This publication primarily presents economic research aimed at improving 
policymaking by the Federal Reserve System and other governmental 
authorities. 
Produced in the Research Department. Edited by Preston J. Miller, Kathleen 
S. Rolfe, and Inga Velde. Graphic design by Phil Swenson and typesetting by 
Terri Desormey, Graphic Services Department. 
Address questions to the Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55480 (telephone 612-340-2341). 
Articles may be reprinted if the source is credited and the Research 
Department is provided with copies of reprints. 
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not 
necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or 
the Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review Summer 1985 
Banking Instability and Regulation 
in the U.S. Free Banking Era* 
Arthur J. Rolnick 
Senior Vice President and 
Director of Research 
Warren E. Weber 
Senior Economist 
Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
The United States is moving toward a less regulated 
banking industry. Banks generally are now allowed to pay 
market rates of interest on most of their deposits and to 
sell many of their products nationwide. And banks in 
some states can now offer a variety of traditionally 
nonbank financial products, such as brokerage, real 
estate, and insurance services. More deregulation is on 
the horizon, too, with the possibility that even the 1933 
Glass-Steagall prohibition against banks underwriting 
corporate securities may be relaxed. Such deregulation, 
which certainly increases competition among banks as 
well as between banks and other financial institutions, is 
viewed by many as benefiting consumers of financial 
services. 
However, bank deregulation may also bring with it 
some very large costs. Even some of the staunchest 
proponents of laissez-faire have viewed banking as 
inherently unstable. According to this view, if left to 
unfettered market forces, banks would be prone to 
massive withdrawals simply because an ill-informed 
public would at times lose confidence in the industry's 
ability to make good on their liabilities. Proponents of this 
view cite numerous bank panics in U.S. history as 
evidence of the industry's inherent instability and have 
argued for bank regulation to keep this instability in 
check. 
Of course, U.S. banking history cannot properly be 
used as evidence of inherent instability in banking. U.S. 
banks have always been regulated to some degree, and 
evidence from even a lightly regulated banking system 
does not constitute evidence of what would happen in a 
totally unregulated system. However, if one accepts the 
proposition that banking is inherently unstable, then U.S. 
banking history can help assess the effectiveness of 
alternative regulatory environments in controlling the 
problem. 
One period in U. S. banking history, the so-called Free 
Banking Era (1837-63), seems a particularly good 
choice for study. Since this period had relatively few bank 
regulations (essentially aimed at protecting those who 
held the currency banks could issue), it allows us to 
isolate the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of those par-
ticular regulations in containing inherent instability. The 
Free Banking Era, moreover, has the reputation for 
wildcat banking, frequent bank failures, and substantial 
losses to users of bank currency despite regulatory 
attempts to protect them. Thus, the period would seem to 
have had enough individual bank problems to have easily 
caused a general loss of confidence in the entire banking 
system. 
Our examination of the evidence indicates, however, 
that that did not happen during the Free Banking Era. 
Many free banks did have problems, but their problems 
were not contagious. The free bank regulations appear to 
have provided the public with enough information about 
This paper is based on work presented at a conference sponsored by the Cato 
Institute in February 1985. Proceedings of that conference are forthcoming in the 
Cato Journal. 
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the financial condition of individual banks to keep the 
inherent instability in banking under control. 
The Concern: Inherent Instability in Banking 
There is no agreement on a precise definition of inherent 
instability in banking. However, the conventional view is 
that it means that general bank panics can occur without 
economy-wide real shocks, that is, without economy-
wide disturbances to real economic activity that affect all 
or most banks. The usual explanation for how this can 
happen involves a local real economic shock that be-
comes exaggerated by the actions of incompletely in-
formed depositors (or holders of other demand liabilities 
of banks, for example, free bank notes).
1 
Incompletely informed depositors are critical to this 
explanation. According to it, the local real shock causes 
runs on some banks by causing the value of their assets to 
fall below the value of their liabilities. Individuals aware 
of this situation rationally want to withdraw deposits from 
these banks and switch to currency or deposits of other 
banks. Since the real shock is local, it does not affect the 
assets of most banks, so informed depositors do not 
withdraw funds from them. Thus, if depositors have full 
information about bank portfolios, no general run or panic 
results. 
Incompletely informed depositors, however, can turn 
the local shock into a general bank panic. Such depositors 
cannot always distinguish local shocks from economy-
wide shocks. More important, they cannot clearly dis-
tinguish banks that are relatively unaffected by the local 
shock and still have sufficient assets to cover their 
deposits (sound banks) from banks that are greatly 
affected and are left with insufficient assets to cover 
deposits (unsound banks). Consequently, incompletely 
informed depositors quite rationally interpret the runs of 
some banks as a signal that other banks may be in trouble. 
Hence, the trouble at a few banks spreads as depositors 
begin to worry about other banks. TTiat is, bank runs are 
contagious because depositors use the observation of runs 
of some banks to revise their views about the safety of 
others.
2 
This explanation of a general bank panic corresponds 
to that of Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 308) for the 
events of 1930: 
A crop of bank failures, particularly in Missouri, Indiana, 
Illinois, Iowa, Arkansas, and North Carolina, led to wide-
spread attempts to convert demand and time deposits into 
currency.... A contagion of fear spread among depositors, 
starting from the agricultural areas, which had experienced 
the heaviest impact of bank failures in the twenties. But such 
contagion knows no geographical limits. 
Clearly this general loss of confidence, due to incom-
plete information, causes more banks to be hurt by the 
local shock than would be hurt if information were 
complete. By demanding their funds, a doubting public 
can force some banks that were not otherwise affected by 
the local shock to close, to go out of business even though 
all depositors are eventually paid off. Still more disturb-
ing, a doubting public can cause some sound banks to fail\ 
to go out of business without being able to fully pay off 
their depositors. Obviously, the local real shock causes 
the value of some assets to fall because some banks have 
to liquidate assets. With complete information, deposi-
tors would be able to determine the new level of asset 
prices, and banks with assets sufficient to cover liabilities 
would not be run. With incomplete information, however, 
asset prices can be lower than their full information level 
because the demands of fearful depositors cause more 
banks to have to liquidate assets. And at these lower asset 
prices, fewer banks have assets sufficient to cover liabili-
ties.
3 
The Observation: Many Free Bank 
Failures and Closings 
At first glance, the Free Banking Era appears to be a 
classic example of uncontrolled inherent instability. The 
few regulations in free banking laws tried to protect 
holders of these banks' major liabilities, bank notes, from 
virtually any loss. Nevertheless, free bank noteholders 
did suffer losses and many free banks went out of 
business. 
Laws and Operations 
Before 1837, all new U.S. banks had to be chartered by a 
state legislature. Although these charters differed from 
bank to bank and from state to state, generally they 
established reserve and capital requirements for a bank 
and limited the types of loans it could make. In practice, 
the chartering system was a cumbersome and very po-
litical process that severely limited the number of banks 
opened. 
Starting in 1837, many states passed general banking 
laws that eliminated the legislative charter requirement 
for a bank to be established. The new laws essentially 
allowed anyone to open a bank that could issue its own 
1A real shock is local if it only affects a particular geographic area or a 
particular class of assets. An economy-wide, or global, shock affects the entire 
country or large classes of assets. 
2An explicit model of inherent instability in banking that incorporates these 
ideas is Diamond and Dybvig's (1983). 
3This is the aspect of bank panics that seems to motivate Friedman and 
Schwartz's (1963) emphasis on the high percentage of liabilities that many failed 
banks ultimately paid off after the Great Depression. 
3 currency (bank notes), take deposits, and make loans. 
The Free Banking Era derives its name from this free 
entry provision of the general banking laws. By 1860, a 
majority of the 33 states in the Union had passed such 
laws. 
Despite its name, though, the Free Banking Era was 
not a period of laissez-faire banking. While entry was 
unrestricted, banks established under the free banking 
laws were subject to other restrictions. Most of the free 
banking laws were patterned on that passed by the New 
York legislature in 1838 (and amended in 1840). In 
particular, they contained its three regulations intended to 
insure the safety of free bank notes: 
• Free banks had to deposit designated state bonds 
with the state banking authority (state auditor or 
treasurer) as security for all notes issued. Most states 
allowed bonds of other states as well as their own; 
some states also allowed federal bonds. 
• Free banks had to pay specie (gold or silver) for notes 
on demand. Failure to redeem even one note meant 
that the state banking authority would close the bank 
and sell all of the assets deposited with it to pay off 
noteholders. Further, in many states, noteholders 
had preference over other bank creditors in terms of 
legal claims on the remaining assets of the bank. 
•In general, free bank stockholders were liable for 
bank losses in an amount up to the value of their 
stock even though free banks were limited liability 
companies. This double liability provision meant 
that, if a bank failed, someone with, say, $25,000 of 
free bank stock not only might lose this investment, 
but also would be liable for an additional $25,000 of 
personal wealth to cover bank losses (including those 
on notes). 
As an illustration of how a free bank operated under 
these laws, consider a potential banker with $50,000 of 
capital. To establish a free bank, that person would buy 
state bonds with this capital and deposit them with, say, 
the state auditor. In exchange, the person would receive 
$50,000 of notes that the new bank could issue. Pre-
sumably, these notes would get into circulation by being 
exchanged for other assets (loans, specie, or more state 
bonds, for example). 
The balance sheet of the prototypical free bank would 
look something like Table 1. This table assumes the free 
banker exchanged the initial $50,000 of notes for 
$25,000 more of state bonds and $25,000 of loans. These 
additional $25,000 of bonds were then deposited with the 
auditor for another $25,000 of notes which were finally 
Table 1 
Balance Sheet of a Prototypical Free Bank 
Assets Liabilities and Capital 
State Bonds $ 75,000 Liabilities: 
Notes Outstanding $ 75,000 
Loans 40,000 
Specie 10,000 Capital 50,000 
Total $125,000 Total $125,000 
exchanged for another $15,000 of loans and $10,000 of 
specie. 
Table 1 illustrates that free bank notes could be risky. 
Here, if the value of the bank's state bonds and loans fell 
below $15,000, then the value of the bank's assets plus 
the $50,000 additional liability of stockholders (due to 
the double liability provision) would be insufficient to pay 
off noteholders. Thus, although the free banking laws 
were intended to promote note safety, they were not 
sufficient to guarantee it. 
Problems 
In a previous study (Rolnick and Weber 1983) we 
presented evidence on the free banking experience of four 
states for which detailed state auditor data are available: 
New York, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. Our 
findings indicated that free banking in these states did 
have problems, though they were quantitatively smaller 
than is usually suggested. Two of our major findings: 
• Some free bank noteholders suffered losses. The 
losses ranged from an average of between 10 and 15 
cents on the dollar in Indiana to an average of about 
25 cents on the dollar in New York and Wisconsin. 
(We exclude Minnesota here because we think our 
earlier loss calculations for that state are far too high. 
We explain why in Rolnick and Weber 1985.) 
• Many free banks did not survive the Free Banking 
Era. Between 1838 and 1863, of the 709 free banks 
that operated in our four states, 48 percent (339) 
went out of business. About one-third of these (104) 
failed; their noteholders suffered losses. The rest 
simply closed; they went out of business but fully 
paid off their noteholders. 
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This large number of bank failures and closings suggests 
that the instability inherent in banking was left unchecked 
during the Free Banking Era. 
A Crucial Missing Element: Contagion 
A large number of banks failing or closing, however, is not 
enough to conclude that the regulations in this period were 
inadequate to stabilize banking. Recall that inherent 
instability in banking manifests itself through a contagious 
loss of confidence, or panic, that leads to trouble at good 
banks as well as bad. Evidence of uncontrolled instability 
must include signs of contagion, that is, signs that 
problems with one bank or with one state banking system 
affected the confidence that the public had in others. 
The nature of free bank notes and the fact that free 
banks failed imply that such losses of confidence could 
have occurred during the Free Banking Era. A local 
shock could have caused the value of the assets backing 
the notes of some free banks to decline, leading holders of 
these notes to desire to redeem them for specie and 
leading some of these banks to fail. If noteholders of banks 
relatively unaffected by the shock were incompletely 
informed, they might have—rightly or wrongly—inter-
preted the redemptions and failures at some banks as 
evidence that their bank was also in trouble. In this way a 
local shock during this period could have caused a bank 
panic, that is, a large number of bank failures and closings 
that were not warranted by the local shock. 
To determine whether the Free Banking Era had such 
bank panics, we first identify periods during these 26 
years when local shocks caused free bank failures in the 
four sample states we have studied before: New York, 
Indiana, Wisconsin, and Minnesota (Rolnick and Weber 
1984). Then we try to determine whether these failures 
were contagious by examining the extent to which they 
spread. 
The obvious first pass at identifying periods when 
shocks affected free banks is to find periods when several 
banks failed. Our findings are displayed in Table 2. 
Notice that most (76 of the 96) free bank failures occurred 
during periods of falling asset prices, as measured by large 
declines in the prices of either Indiana or Missouri state 
bonds. We would expect declines in the prices of these 
bonds to be potential causes of failures in at least three of 
our sample states because Indiana 5s made up a large 
portion of the bonds backing the notes of the banks that 
failed in New York and Indiana and Missouri 6s made up 
a large portion of the bonds backing the notes of the banks 
that failed in Wisconsin. The remaining 20 failures 
grouped at the bottom of the table occurred during periods 
of steady or rising bond prices. 
Table 2 
Free Bank Failures Grouped by Changes 
in Asset Prices, 1841-61 
Number of Bank Failures in Sample States 
Periods When  Four 
Asset Prices Were*  New York  Indiana  Wisconsin  Minnesota  States 
Falling 
Jan. 1841-April 1842  20  —"  —  —  20 
May 1844-July 1846  2  —  —  —  2 
July-Dec. 1854  1  11  0  —  12 
March-Oct. 1857  1  0  0  —  1 
June 1860-June1861  1  1  37  2  41 
Total  25  12  37  2  76 
Stable or Rising 
May 1842-April 1844  3  —  —  —  3 
December 1847  1  —  —  —  1 
October 1851  2  —  —  —  2 
Jan. 1853-June 1854  2  1  0  —  3 
Jan. 1855-June 1856  0  3  0  —  3 
Jan.-Dec. 1858  1  0  0  0  1 
June-Sept. 1859  0  0  0  7  7 
Total  9  4  0  7  20 
All Periods  34  16  37  9  96 
'The assets defining these periods are Indiana 5s and Missouri 6s. The periods when their prices were 
stable or rising exclude lengthy periods when no free banks failed. 
'A dash (—) indicates that the state did not have a free banking law during the particular period. 
Source: Rolnick and Weber 1984 
Table 2 shows that 80 of the 96 free bank failures seem 
to have occurred within four time periods. (The remaining 
16 failures did not occur in large groups.) We are con-
fident that three of these periods, accounting for a total 
of 68 of the 80 failures, were associated with local real 
shocks: 
• January 1841-April 1842, when 20 New York free 
banks failed. The local real shock here was the 
possibility, which arose as early as 1839, that some 
states would default on their bonds due to insufficient 
revenues from the extensive railroad and canal 
5 projects that these bonds were used to finance 
(Ratchford 1941). In fact, Indiana did default in 
1841, along with Arkansas, Florida, and Mississippi 
and followed by Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Michigan, and Pennsylvania in 1842. 
• June- September 1859, when 7 of Minnesota*s 12 
free banks failed. The local real shock here was the 
suspension of construction on Minnesota's railroads 
in the late spring of 1859. This caused a drop in the 
price of Minnesota 7s (the so-called railroad bonds) 
that backed the notes of several Minnesota free 
banks. We have determined that the failure of at least 
5 Minnesota free banks was related to the suspension 
of railroad construction (Rolnick and Weber 1985). 
• June 1860-June 1861, when 41, mostly Wisconsin, 
free banks failed. The local real shock here was 
obviously the onset of the Civil War. The shock can 
be considered local in the sense that the prices of 
bonds of Southern states, like Missouri 6s, were 
affected much more than those of Northern states. 
For example, during this period the price of North 
Carolina 6s declined 56 percent; Missouri 6s, 57 
percent; and Virginia 6s, 59 percent. In contrast, the 
price of Indiana 5 s declined only 20 percent 
One period with a group of bank failures we have not 
been able to definitely associate with a local real shock: 
July-December 1854, when 12 free banks failed, all but 
1 in Indiana. The 11 Indiana failures represent 15 percent 
of all free banks established in that state up to that time. 
Evidence from contemporary sources seems to indicate 
that the shock was more economy-wide than local. 
However, prices of Indiana bonds declined more than 
those of other state bonds during this period, suggesting 
that we can treat the period as if there had been a local 
shock which primarily affected Indiana bond prices. 
Having identified local shocks and apparently related 
free bank failures, we now need to determine whether the 
failures led to unwarranted runs on other banks and their 
subsequent failures or closings. A positive determination 
would indicate that the instability inherent in banking was 
unchecked during the Free Banking Era. Our first test is 
to determine whether failures in any one of our four 
sample states were followed by failures and closings in the 
others. This test is suggested by the view of Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963, p. 308) that "contagion knows no 
geographical limits." 
The definition of contagion as bank failures spreading 
across state lines means that only the three post-1852 
periods we have isolated could potentially provide evi-
dence of contagion. That is because only one of our four 
sample states, New York, allowed free banking before 
1852. None of the three post-185 2 periods provides 
evidence that free bank failures were contagious. Specifi-
cally, 
•Between July and December 1854, only Indiana 
seems to have had banking problems. Of the 232 free 
banks operating in New York in September 1854, 
only 1 bank failed and 14 banks closed by the end of 
the year. And of the 19 banks operating in Wisconsin 
in July 1854, none failed and only 1 closed during 
this period. 
• Between June and September 1859, banking prob-
lems seem to have been limited to Minnesota. 
During this period, none of the approximately 390 
free banks operating in New York, Indiana, and 
Wisconsin failed and no more than 7 banks closed, 
all in Wisconsin. 
• Between June 1860 and June 1861, banking prob-
lems seem to have been confined to Wisconsin. 
During this period, of the 273 free banks operating in 
New York in December 1859, only 1 failed and 12 
closed, and of the 17 free banks operating in Indiana 
in January 1860, only 2 went out of business.
4 
This focus on an interstate test of contagion during the 
Free Banking Era can be justified by the concern about a 
general loss of confidence in the banking system. But a 
skeptic might argue that more geographically limited 
bank runs—say, of an intrastate nature—could also 
indicate such a loss. That is, while the Free Banking Era 
may not have had bank panics that crossed state bound-
aries, it could have had panics within states. 
Therefore, we perform a second test, looking for 
evidence of intrastate contagion. Although we cannot 
determine explicitly whether bank failures spread through 
unwarranted bank runs in our sample states, we can 
establish that within a state the banks that failed or closed 
after local shocks had portfolios much more vulnerable to 
the shocks than the banks that remained in business. This 
suggests that even intrastate contagion was limited. 
Minnesota's experience is a good example. The banks 
that failed in this state in the summer of 185 9 backed their 
notes almost exclusively with Minnesota 7s, the ill-fated 
railroad bonds. Those banks that stayed in business had 
bonds that held their value, either Minnesota 8s (backed 
by explicit taxes) or Ohio 6s. 
4All figures on the total number of operating free banks are from Rolnick and 
Weber 1983, p. 1088. 
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Tables 3 and 4 
The Relationship Between State Bonds Backing Notes 
and Bank Status After Local Shocks in the Free Banking Era 
Table 3 
In Wisconsin—The State Bonds Backing the Notes of Free Banks on January 31, 1860 
Banks That in June 1860-June 1861 
All 107 Banks  Failed (35)  Closed (17)  Stayed Open (55) 
% of  %of  %of  %of 
State Bonds  Face Value  Total  Face Value  Total  Face Value  Total  Face Value  Total 
Southern 
Missouri 6s  $1,974,000  40.6  $1,016,000  48.8  $211,000  32.9  $ 747,000  34.9 
Tennessee 6s  738,000  15.2  320,000  15.4  120,000  18.7  298,000  13.9 
North Carolina 6s  409,500  8.4  197,000  9.5  27,500  4.3  185,000  8.6 
Virginia 5s and 6s  233,340  4.8  86,600  4.2  71,240  11.1  75,500  3.5 
Louisiana 5s and 6s  150,500  3.1  88,000  4.2  17,000  2.7  45,500  2.1 
Other Southern  62,000  1.3  36,000  1.7  3,000  .5  23,000  1.1 
Total  $3,567,340  73.4  $1,743,600  83.8  $449,740  70.1  $1,374,000  64.2 
Northern 
Illinois 6s  $ 542,020  11.1  $ 132,420  6.4  $ 98,600  15.4  $ 311,000  14.5 
Ohio 6s  225,000  4.6  86,000  4.1  31,000  4.8  108,000  5.0 
Michigan 6s  185,500  3.8  60,000  2.9  30,000  4.7  95,500  4.5 
Wisconsin 6s  100,000  2.1  39,000  1.9  5,000  .8  56,000  2.6 
Other Northern  241,500*  5.0  19,500  .9  27,000*  4.2  195,000**  9.1 
Total  $1,294,020  26.6  $ 336,920  16.2  $191,600  29.9  $ 765,500  35.8 
All State Bonds  $4,861,360  100.0  $2,080,520  100.0  $641,340  100.0  $2,139,500  100.0 
Note: Percentage columns may not add to totals due to rounding. 
'This value includes only bonds of Wisconsin railroads. 
"This value includes $50,000 of bonds of Wisconsin railroads. 
Source: Wisconsin 1860: Rolnick and Weber 1983, 1984 
Table 4 
In New York—The State Bonds Backing the Notes of Free Banks on December 31, 1839 
Banks That in Jan. 1841-April 1842 
All 73 Banks  Failed or Closed (17)  Stayed Open (56) 
%of  %of  % of 
State Bonds  Face Value  Total  Face Value  Total  Face Value  Total 
Defaulting States 
Arkansas 6s  $1,099,000  22.0  $ 220,000  14.1  $ 879,000  25.7 
Illinois 6s  1,045,000  21.0  395,000  25.4  650,000  19.0 
Indiana 5s  1,043,000  20.9  787,000  50.5  256,000  7.5 
Michigan 6s  872,000  17.5  80,000  5.1  792,000  23.1 
Total  $4,059,000  81.4  $1,482,000  95.1  $2,577,000  75.2 
Nondefaulting States 
New York 5s  $ 478,200  9.6  $ 0  .0  $ 478,200  14.0 
Alabama 5s  207,000  4.2  66,000  4.2  141,000  4.1 
Other  240,500  4.8  10,000  .6  230,500  6.7 
Total  $ 925,700  18.6  $ 76,000  4.9  $ 849,700  24.8 
All State Bonds  $4,984,700  100.0  $1,558,000  100.0  $3,426,700  100.0 
Note: Percentage columns may not add to totals due to rounding. 
Source: New York 1839; Rolnick and Weber 1983, 1984 
7 Wisconsin had a similar experience. The Wisconsin 
banks that went out of business between June 1860 and 
June 1861 had a far higher percentage of Southern bonds 
backing their notes than those that stayed in business. In 
Table 3 we group the bonds held by the Wisconsin state 
treasurer as backing for free bank notes on January 31, 
1860, by whether the bonds were those of a Southern or a 
Northern state and by whether the banks issuing the notes 
subsequently failed, closed, or remained in business. The 
banks that failed and closed had 84 and 70 percent of their 
portfolios in Southern bonds. In contrast, the banks that 
remained open held only 64 percent of their portfolio in 
such bonds. 
New York free banks follow the same pattern. Here 
the local shock was states defaulting on their bonds, and 
failed and closed banks had a higher percentage of their 
portfolio in defaulted bonds (Table 4). Of the 73 New 
York banks that had bonds deposited with the state 
auditor on December 31, 1839, 16 banks failed and 1 
closed between January 1841 and April 1842. Those 17 
banks held nearly all—95 percent—of their state bond 
portfolio in the bonds of states that defaulted. The banks 




Adequate Public Information 
Overall, the evidence on free bank failures and closings 
indicates that free banking experienced little if any of the 
contagion supposed to be symptomatic of inherent insta-
bility. But if banking is inherently unstable, why weren't 
free bank failures contagious? Why didn't the bank 
failures in one state spread to other states or even within a 
state? A possible explanation: The requirement that free 
banks had to keep a reserve of state bonds behind their 
notes led to the public being reasonably well informed 
about a substantial part of most free bank portfolios. Free 
bank failures caused by local shocks did not spread, that 
is, because the public knew more or less which banks 
were truly affected by the shocks. 
Consider the seven free bank failures in Minnesota 
between June and September 1859. The local real shock 
here affected only the price of Minnesota 7s (the railroad 
bonds), and these bonds backed the notes of at least five of 
the banks that failed. There was no reason for the 
Minnesota failures to spread because the public knew that 
Minnesota 7s did not back the notes of banks in any other 
state. In New York, notes stated whether they were 
backed by state bonds alone or by state bonds and 
mortgages, and free banks established in that state after 
1840 were only allowed to back notes with New York or 
U.S. bonds. In Indiana and Wisconsin, Minnesota 7s 
could have backed free bank notes, but publicly available 
reports on individual bank portfolios by state banking 
authorities revealed that none did. And within Minne-
sota, the newspapers kept the public well informed about 
which were the so-called railroad banks. 
Or, consider the 41 free bank failures between June 
1860 and June 1861, which occurred mostly in Wiscon-
sin. The local shock here, again, was the onset of the Civil 
War, which caused the prices of bonds of Southern states 
to decline far more than the prices of bonds of Northern 
states. Since state bonds were traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange, current market price information was 
readily available to the public. But the public knew more 
than that. The Wisconsin failures very likely did not 
trigger failures and closings in New York and Indiana, our 
other two sample states with free banking systems of any 
size at the time, because people in those states knew that 
Southern bonds were a much smaller part of the note 
backing in their states than in Wisconsin. As noted above, 
after 1840 New York allowed only New York or U.S. 
bonds as backing for notes. In Indiana, the state auditor 
regularly reported the bond backing of notes on a bank-
by-bank basis. He reported on November 1, 1859, for 
example, that only 44 percent of the notes of Indiana's 
free banks were backed by bonds of Southern states. 
Summary and Implications 
If banking is inherently unstable, then the riskiness of free 
bank notes could have led to bank panics during the Free 
Banking Era. Yet we found no evidence that bank failures 
in one state spread to other states or even spread within a 
state during this period. A plausible explanation for the 
lack of contagion is that the state bonds deposited with the 
state banking authorities as backing for free bank notes 
became public information. 
This, of course, does not mean that free bank failures 
never made the public question some banks. Since 
noteholders were aware of which bonds backed their 
notes, however, they were at least not likely to lose 
confidence in sound banks once a bank or even a group of 
banks failed.
6 That is, we have found that the public 
5 The data on bond holdings for both Wisconsin and New York are taken from 
the last balance sheet available before the period of the local shock. Since the date 
of this balance sheet precedes the local shock period, the numbers of total banks 
and bank failures and closings do not agree with those given in Table 2 or earlier in 
the text. 
6 Some might be willing to accept the interpretation that the state bond reserve 
requirement prevented bank failures from spreading, but would argue that this 
regulation had the undesirable side effect of increasing the number of free bank 
failures. They would argue that this regulation, by requiring banks to back their 
note issue with risky state bonds, led free banks to hold riskier portfolios than they 
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generally did not lose confidence in banking during the 
Free Banking Era because they were relatively well 
informed about the quality of the backing of their notes. 
This study of one period of U.S. banking history 
suggests that regulations which provide information to the 
public about the quality of the backing of bank liabilities 
can effectively control inherent instability.
7 The obvious 
implication for today is that regulations intended to 
control banking instability should provide depositors with 
better information on the quality of the backing of their 
bank deposits. Two examples of regulatory changes 
which would do that are more complete disclosure of 
individual bank portfolios and higher reserve ratios on 
bank liabilities. 
This study must be interpreted cautiously, however. 
Nothing in it suggests that in a totally unregulated en-
vironment information on the quality of bank portfolios 
would not be made available to the public either by banks 
themselves or by some bank rating service (such as the 
bank note reporters that were regularly published during 
the Free Banking Era). Our study provides no evidence, 
that is, on the deeper question of whether or not banking is 
inherently unstable. 
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would have without such a regulation. The evidence presented here does not 
support or reject that argument. An argument against it, however, is that, despite 
the state bond reserve requirement, free banks could have made their notes 
perfectly safe by purchasing perfectly safe assets with them; that is, the regulation 
may not have been a binding constraint on free bank behavior (King 1983, p. 147, 
fii. 31). 
^Lawrence White's (1984) study of the Scottish free banking system (1727-
1844) is also consistent with the view that regulations which provide information to 
noteholders can prevent the spread of bank failures. In the Scottish case the 
noteholder information was provided by the unlimited liability of most Scottish free 
bankers and good information on their wealth (White 1984, pp. 41-42): 
A Scottish creditor was legally entitled to the debtor's real and heritable estate as well [as 
the debtor's personal estate]. The amount of real and heritable estate an individual 
possessed could be easily determined by consulting public records. . . . It. . . enabled 
members of the public, if they wished, to ascertain the ultimate assets of a local banking 
partnership. The great security provided to creditors under Scots law helped immunize 
Scottish banks against any danger of a panic-induced run. 
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